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ABSTRACT
  is article examines how judges can raise points of law ex o)  cio in a comparative context. 
Based on Schlesinger’s case oriented factual method, it compares the relevant provisions 
of Italian, Hungarian, Swiss, French, Belgian, German and Austrian civil procedure.  e 
main conclusion is that there is no common legal solution in Europe and that the national 
legal systems developed divergent approaches. However, two models can be identi4 ed: in 
the 4 rst system, the principle of judicial passivity plays a crucial role, while the second 
one is based on a general authorization under strict control with special regard to the 
requirements of a fair trial. Because of this duality, this paper argues that a uni4 ed model 
does not actually exist. However, contrary to the apparent divergences, a common core 
composed of two elements can be dra9 ed.
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§1. PRELIMINARY AND METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS
A. INTRODUCTION
In a Grand Chamber decision at the end of 2009, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) had to face an evergreen and uneasy question concerning European 
procedural regimes.1 In this state aid case, the CJEU had to decide whether a court 
can act on its own motion in public policy related issues, or whether it is bound by the 
principle that the subject matter of a case is strictly determined by the parties. Even 
though the problem seems to be purely theoretical at L rst sight, it has serious practical 
repercussions. Fundamentally, the scope of both the national and community judges’ 
power to decide a case autonomously,2 that is, totally or partially independent of the 
parties’ original will and intention expressed in the pleas submitted to the court, is 
strongly dependent on the answer given to this question.
E us, this important decision re-exposed the problem of whether or not courts have 
a right or a duty to raise points of law on their own motion in a European Union legal 
context. Its relevance cannot be ignored since both the primacy and the direct ej ect 
of EU law is dependent upon it in the everyday adjudication at the national level. As 
a preliminary remark, it should be mentioned that the CJEU’s case law provides a 
certain leeway in this question for the Member States since it does not require national 
legislators to establish a civil procedure framework in which the ex o)  cio application of 
EU law is compulsory. Essentially, it makes it dependent of the general setting of national 
civil procedure.3 However, an exclusive study of the CJEU’s case law does not provide 
a comprehensive understanding of this problem.4 National legislation should also be 
analysed, since an in-depth discussion of various national models may shed light on the 
1 Case C-89/08 P Commission v. Ireland et al. [2009] ECR I-11245.
2 Concerning the question whether judges should have the opportunity to decide cases autonomously, 
even in the rational and predictable context of modern formal law, see the seminal article by Eugen 
Ehrlich, one of the founding fathers of the modern sociology of law. See E. Ehrlich, ‘Freie RechtsL ndung 
und freie Rechtswissenschav ’, in E. Ehrlich, Recht und Leben (Duncker und Humblot, 1967), p. 170–
202. For a recent review, see B. Hess, ‘Judicial Discretion’, in M. Storme and B. Hess (eds.), Discretionary 
Power of the Judge. Limits and Control (Kluwer, 2003), p. 45–72. For a complex (EU law – comparative 
law – legal history) approach of ex o)  cio application of law by judges, see J. Chorus, ‘Le relevé d’o9  ce 
des moyens de droit et de fait: l’application des règles du droit européen par le juge national: étude de 
droit comparé et d’histoire de droit’, in L. Vacca (ed.), Scienza giuridica interpretazione e sviluppo del 
diritto europeo (Jovene Editori, 2013), p. 123–165. With special regard to the context of EU law, see A. 
Hartkamp, European Law and National Private Law. E@ ect of EU Law and European Human Rights Law 
on Legal Relationship between Individuals (Kluwer, 2012), margin numbers 124–130.
3 See Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 van Schijndel [1995] ECR I-04705, para. 22.
4 E e leading cases in this L eld might be Case C-166/73 Reinmühlen [1974] ECR-33; Case C-106/77 
Simmenthal [1978] ECR-630; Joined Cases C-87/90, C-88/90 and C-89/90 Verholen [1991] ECR I-3768; 
Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 van Schijndel [1995] ECR I-04705; Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck 
[1995] ECR I-04599; Case C-72/95 Kraaijeveld [1996] ECR I-5403; Joined Cases C-222/05 to C-225/05 
van der Weerd [2007] ECR I-4233.
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major points of the European understanding of ex o)  cio application of law before civil 
courts. E e application of a comparative law methodology is therefore indispensable for 
this research as it is the most useful tool when mapping similarities and divergences of 
co-existing domestic legal models.
B. COMPARATIVE PROCEDURAL LAW ON STAGE
E e comparison of procedural law provisions is a very relevant but, simultaneously, a 
slightly unpopular L eld of study within general comparative law scholarship. E is is 
understandable to the extent that procedural law can rapidly change, re~ ecting certain 
policy choices of the legislator.5 Additionally, some secondary, non-legal factors – such 
as historical reasons,6 the peculiarities of the general institutional structure,7 or the 
unintentional ej ects of legislation8 – also seriously aj ect their general context. Hence, 
a comparative mapping and assessment of procedural law provisions can generally be 
very demanding. Nevertheless and contrary to these di9  culties, the comparison of 
national procedural regimes is necessary for this study. A comparison provides valuable 
information and is useful for the broadening of our general legal knowledge as well as for 
the formulation of normative policy choices.9
As initially stated, this article is devoted to a tiny, but highly relevant segment of 
procedural regimes: how, and to what extent, do national civil procedures allow judges 
to introduce new legal elements of their own accord during civil proceedings? What 
are the main lessons to be drawn from a comparison of this practice in dij erent 
jurisdictions? Generally, behind the very technical surface one can L nd a condensation 
of many competing principles and expectations playing an important role in the design 
5 E e advent of ‘managerial judging’ in the US, broadening the ‘managerial powers’ of judges in order 
to facilitate reaching settlements, considerably changed the entire culture of lawsuits in civil law cases 
starting in the 1970s. See for a classical article, J. Resnik, ‘Managerial Judges’, 96 Harvard Law Review 
(1982–1983), p. 376–412; about the recent developments, S.S. Gensler, ‘Judicial Case Management’, 60 
Duke Law Journal (2010–2011), p. 670–743.
6 On the impact of historical factors on the formation of modern European procedural laws, with special 
regard to the cross-border in~ uences, see C.H. van Rhee, ‘Introduction’, in. C.H. van Rhee (ed.), 
European Traditions in Civil Procedure (Intersentia, 2005), p. 3–23.
7 See for example the general setting of the French system, where two dij erent ways of legal procedure 
(juridictions de l’ordre judiciaire and juridiction de l’ordre administrative) exist simultaneously. See 
H. Caniard et al., ‘France’, in Cour de justice des Communautés Européennes, Les juridictions des 
États membres de l’Union Européenne. Structure et organisation (Communautés européennes, 2009), 
p. 261–314.
8 For example in France, the introduction of the so-called ‘question prioritaire de constitutionnalité ’ in 
2010, providing the opportunity for an ‘a posteriori’ constitutional control of legislation, signiL cantly 
changed the relationship between the Conseil constitutionnel, Cour de cassation and Conseil d’État by 
subduing the latter two courts to the Conseil constitutionnel in cases related to constitutional justice.
9 For example, E e ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure declare that it can 
even be ‘a basis for future initiatives in reforming civil procedure’. Compare, ‘E e ALI/UNIDROIT 
Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure’, 4 Uniform Law Review (2004), p. 758.
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of civil procedural law systems. E e national solutions in this L eld can be motivated by 
various, frequently competing principles and interests. For instance, private autonomy, 
material justice expectations, fair trial, public policy choices, governmental interest, and 
conceptions of the role of judges all could have a decisive role in the shaping of national 
provisions. Furthermore, the precise formulation and functioning of these solutions 
can considerably in~ uence the parties’ procedural strategies, thereby deL ning the entire 
litigation culture.
§2. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND 
DELIMITATIONS
A. A CASE ORIENTED FACTUAL STARTING POINT AND SOME 
FURTHER DELIMITATION
As a methodological basis, this paper follows the so-called ‘case oriented factual approach’ 
coined by R.B. Schlesinger.10 It states that the starting point of the comparison is neither 
a given legal provision, nor an institutional solution, but a simple factual situation. In this 
study this situation can be brie~ y summarized as follows: if a judge wants to raise a point 
of law not included in the parties’ submission, can he/she do so or not? Alternatively: can 
a judge base his/her decision on a point of law which was not mentioned in the parties’ 
claims, but was solely raised on his own motion? E e most important problem is the 
capacity available to judges to autonomously decide on the application of those legal 
rules or points which are outside of the scope of the parties’ claims.
E is factual situation is composed of two elements. E e L rst one is related to the 
judges’ legal capacity to act during the procedure; this is the actual setting of civil 
procedure rules determining the boundaries of judicial actions (for instance, suspension 
of the procedure, adjournment of the hearing, L ning the parties, ordering ad interim 
relief, or relying on a point of law on its own motion). E e second element pertains 
to judges’ autonomy how to make a decision based on such legal points that were not 
included in the parties’ submission. E is study will discuss the national civil procedure 
rules from this aspect, meaning it will not focus on the legal categorizations but it will 
look for those rules that have a substantial impact on these two factual elements. In sum, 
the research question of this paper can be summarized as follows: to what extent and 
how do national civil procedures allow judges to introduce new legal elements on their 
own motion in a trial and what are the main lessons to be drawn from their comparison?
10 See R.B. Schlesinger, ‘E e Common Core of Legal Systems – An Emerging Subject of Comparative 
Study’, in K. Nadelmann et al.  (eds.), XXth Century Comparative and ConK ict Laws. Legal Essays 
in Honor of Hessel E. Yntema (A.W. Sythoj , 1961), p. 65–73. For a contemporary discussion, see M. 
Bussani and U. Mattei, ‘E e Common Core Approach to European Private Law’, 3 Columbia Journal of 
European Law (1997–1998), p. 339–356.
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Some delimitation should be made at the very beginning in order to specify the 
paper’s scope as precisely as possible. First, this research is exclusively concerned 
with civil procedural regimes, so neither administrative law, nor criminal process is 
considered.11 E us, this article only deals with civil procedure; therefore, the possible 
insights garnered cannot be automatically applied to other L elds of law. E ey may 
possibly become points of reference, but nothing more. E is choice was motivated by the 
recognition that both administrative and criminal law are strongly pervaded by public 
interest through governmental policy choices. E is setting, primarily focused on public 
interest, generally provides a broader space to manoeuvre for courts as autonomous 
agencies of the state. Civil procedure is still based, at least in principle, on civil autonomy 
and it is more or less comprehensively re~ ected in the entirety of various procedures.
Lastly, a technical problem should also be mentioned. In European civil procedural 
regimes, two special ways to raise points of law on the courts own motion exist amongst 
European legal systems. E e most obvious option is when the civil procedure provides 
a certain well-deL ned opportunity for judges to raise general and basic procedural 
requirements autonomously.12 If a fundamental element is missed from the plaintij ’s 
claim, the judge can raise this problem freely and dismisses the claim if it is necessary. 
However, this article does not intend to discuss this dimension of the problem. E e key 
aspect of this research is the ability of the courts to introduce new legal elements into the 
discussion during the hearings, and, if introduced, whether they can base their decisions 
(at least partially) on these elements? E us, we focus on this second dimension, that is, on 
the possibilities of judges to act and decide autonomously or ex o)  cio.
B. THE LEGAL SYSTEMS SELECTED AND JUSTIFYING THE CHOICE
A further methodological point that must be stressed at the very beginning is that this 
research focuses only on some of the European legal systems. Consequently, it does not 
strive to provide a comprehensive, all-embracing analysis either in geographical terms, 
or from a legal perspective. Only a part of the main legal cultures of the Western Legal 
Tradition13 is discussed in this study, predominantly due to practical concerns. Chief 
amongst them is the lack of linguistic competence. No single scholar may have such a 
command of each Western- and Central-European language that enables her or him 
to provide a comprehensive study of all relevant legal systems. Furthermore, and it 
11 Compare F.C. de la Torre, ‘Le relevé d’o9  ce par la juridiction communautaire’, Cahiers de droit européen 
(2005), p. 397–401. For a comparative analysis of administrative processes, see J. Schwarze, Europäisches 
Verwaltungsrecht. Entstehung und Entwicklung im Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinscha9  (Nomos, 
2005), especially p. 1201–1271.
12 For example, §139(3) of the German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung) set forth that the 
court must call the parties’ attention to those points, mostly prerequisites to suit, that may be raised by 
the court’s own motion.
13 See H.J. Berman, Law and Revolution.  e Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard University 
Press, 1999), with special regard to p. 7–10.
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makes this challenge even harder, as mastering a language is simply not enough when 
making a comparative study. A certain level of knowledge of both the general and the 
legal culture of a given country is also necessary for a real comparison.14 E erefore, due 
to the aforementioned reasons I selected such legal systems for this study which can be 
studied by using primary and secondary sources in English, French, German, Italian 
and Hungarian – languages and cultures with which I am familiar to a certain, varying 
degree. As a result, this research presents certain Western national and supranational 
patterns and a comparative discussion of these patterns, yet, further remarks and 
additions can be easily added.
In addition, another methodological concern should also be addressed. E is article 
does not discuss each national solution with the same level of scientiL c scrutiny. Rather, it 
tries to identify some core solutions which were comprehensively or partially adopted by 
various other procedural regimes. Precisely this approach goes back to the concept of the 
so-called ‘core’ and derivative legal systems (systèmes souches et derivés) that has already 
been submitted in comparative law scholarship from the 1950s.15 Its main insight is that 
not all legal systems have the same signiL cance and role in general legal history. Some of 
them exert major in~ uence on a certain L eld, while others are less relevant. E erefore, the 
study of those systems where a given legal institution emerged may provide a substantial 
help in eventually understanding the law of those countries which imported the given 
legal institution. E is does not mean that there may be no dij erences in the importing 
legal systems, but it supposes that there are no structural dij erences.
In this sense, the paper analyses two patterns of legal regulation in detail, the model 
of judicial passivity and that of the general authorization. As for the L rst approach, 
this paper analyses the Italian, the Swiss and the Hungarian rules, while the study 
of the second approach is mainly based on the French and German legal systems. In 
addition, Belgian and Austrian law are also referred to as an illustration. Even though 
these references to Belgian and Austrian civil procedure mostly have an illustrative 
role, they may however also be interesting contributions to the more general problem of 
legal transplants; as they can illustrate how a principle can be imported to another legal 
system having an almost similar cultural character.16
14 Compare René David who argues that the best way to avoid dilettantism – one of the main dangers of 
comparative law – is to compare the law of such countries about which the comparatist has a good level 
of cultural knowledge, including a certain command of the language. See R. David, Traité élémentaire 
de droit civil comparé (LGDJ, 1950), especially p. 20–25.
15 Compare P. Arminjon, B. Nolde and M. Wolj , Traité de droit comparé I (LGDJ, 1950), p.  47–49. 
According to the authors, seven ‘core’ legal system exist: the French, the German, the Scandinavian, the 
English, the Russian, the Islamic and the Hindu. Schlesinger also suggests a similar approach: he argues 
that the selection of some in~ uential legal systems at the beginning of the study can really be helpful 
as it contributes to the understanding of other legal system. See R.B. Schlesinger, in K. Nadelmann et 
al. (eds), XXth Century Comparative and ConK ict Laws. Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel E. Yntema.
16 See as a classic work, A. Watson, Legal Transplants. An Approach to Comparative Law (Scottish Academic 
Press, 1974). For the recent ‘state of art’ in this L eld, see G. Mousourakis, ‘Legal Transplants and Legal 
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§3. MODEL ONE: THE PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL PASSIVITY 
AND EXCEPTIONS
One of the main European models regulating the way of ex o)  cio application of law 
in civil procedure is the restrictive approach. Essentially, this solution prohibits judges 
from autonomously raising points of law. E e phrasing of these clauses is always short 
and compact, generally being no longer than a simple declaration or prohibition. It can 
be clearly seen that the legislator seemingly strived to regulate this question as evidently 
as it was possible within the framework of legal language. However, to complete the 
picture, other parts of the civil procedure code or case law always warrant a number 
of possible exceptions as well. E us, this approach is framed on the logic of a main rule 
alongside possible exceptions. Because of this twofold structure, the best option to fully 
understand the elements is to examine both components independently.
A. THE PROHIBITION
E e inherent diversity of legal cultures17 teaches us that even such a simple point as a 
prohibition of doing something can appear in very dij erent forms. One can clearly read 
the declaration of judicial passivity in the pages of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure as 
it simply declares that ‘the judge shall decide upon all the claims and within its limits’, 
therefore, he cannot introduce sua potente new elements to the case.18 Consequently, 
judgments that are at least partially based on autonomously raised points of law are 
generally forbidden. E e case law of the Italian courts reinforced this restrictive approach 
since it declared that it is prohibited for a court to grant a relief dij erent from the original 
claims.19
E e Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure formulates this general prohibition from 
another angle. It declares that the court is bound by the parties’ claims and declarations.20 
Hungarian scholars agree that this provision is one of the most important corollaries 
of the principle that civil procedure is fundamentally party-driven.21 As a result, the 
Development. A Jurisprudential and Comparative Law Approach’, 54 Acta Juridica Hungarica (2013), 
p. 219–236.
17 Compare P. Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems are not Converging’, 45 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (1996), p. 52–81; or W. van Gerven, ‘Bringing (Private) Laws Closer to Each Other at 
the European Level’, in F. Cafaggi (ed.),  e Institutional Framework of European Private Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2005), www.casebooks.eu/documents/2005–01–18_WvG_Impact_courts_on_
private_law.pdf.
18 Article  112 Italian Code of Civil Procedure (Codice di procedura civile). S. Grossi and M.C. Pagni, 
Commentary on the Italian Code of Civil Procedure (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 158.
19 Ibid., p. 159. See for example, Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Lavoro Civile, Sentenza 11 gennaio 2011, n. 
455.
20 Article 3(2) Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure (1952. évi III. törvény a polgári perrendtartásról).
21 Compare L. Gáspárdy et al., Polgári perjog. Általános rész (KJK-Kerszöv, 2005), p. 32–34.
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national legislator did not focus on the explicit prohibition for courts to raise points 
of law on their own motion, but underlined the duties of the judges. E ey cannot raise 
points of law, since they are bound by the parties’ intents expressed in the claims.
Another dij erent approach can be found in Swiss law. In Switzerland, the code 
simply declares that the court must ex o)  cio apply the law22 as other codes of civil 
procedure do.23 E us, on an initial reading, it appears to ignore our topic. One can easily 
recognize that this provision mirrors the classical procedural principle iura novit curia, 
one of the cornerstones of modern procedural law. However, its relevance comes from 
the fact that in the eyes of commentators this provision is strictly limited by a principle. 
E is principle states that the court is bound by the claims of the parties – Bindung an 
die geltend gemachten Ansprüche or Klageidentität –, that is, ex o)  cio application of 
law can only be done within the boundaries of the parties claims.24 Indeed, the court 
can only adjudicate within the boundaries of the parties’ submissions. E erefore, from 
this provision – which is a simple statement and contains no prohibition at all – it is 
impossible to deduce in reality that courts may have the right to raise points of law on 
their own motion.
Nevertheless, the Swiss legislator took an even further step and speciL ed this principle. 
E e next article of the code shows the strong impact of the so-called ‘Dispositionsmaxime’, 
granting fundamental power to the parties over their cases. E e code explains that the 
court (i) cannot grant more or any dij erent thing than has been requested by a party, 
and (ii) it cannot even grant less than has been recognized by an opposing party.25 E us, 
in principle the court must strictly respect both the scope of the claims and the parties’ 
will.
B. THE EXCEPTIONS
Obviously, such strict regulations would harshly contravene many underlying elements 
of civil procedure. For instance, material justice expectations or public interests in the 
administration of justice would be seriously harmed if parties could control a civil law 
trial in absolute terms.26 E erefore, these legal systems should also have harmonizing 
mechanisms in place to relax the strictness of this general prohibition symbolizing the 
parties’ all-embracing power over their cases.
E ese procedural regimes try to solve this problem through creating exceptions, 
sometimes really broad or vague, under the general rule. It is unnecessary to outline 
22 Article 57 Swiss Code of Civil Procedure (Code de procédure civile).
23 For example, Article  12 L rst sentence French Code of Civil Procedure (Nouveau code de procédure 
civile).
24 K. Spuhler, L. Tenchoi and D. Infanger (eds.), Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung (Helbing Lichtenhahn 
Verlag, 2010), p. 318.
25 Article 58(1) Swiss Code of Civil Procedure.
26 Compare G. Radbruch, Rechtsphilosphie (Koehler, 1956), p. 97–105.
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them individually but certain important exceptions should be mentioned. E e legal 
techniques introducing these exceptions are also worthy of a short analysis. E e 
Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure introduced a brief sentence within hyphens into 
the general prohibition: unless law does not regulate it dij erently.27 E us, the national 
legislator reserved the right to deviate from the general prohibition based on a case-by-
case legislative authorization. Likewise, the Swiss legislator provided a general option to 
deviate in the form of a reservation, concerning the courts’ power to raise points of law 
(O)  cialgrundsatz).28 Both of these provisions say nothing about the precise content, that 
is, what they mean exactly by these reservations. Hence, they should be somewhere else 
within the corpus of national laws.
E e L rst exceptions are those legal provisions which explicitly authorize judges to 
deviate from the general rule in certain, well-deL ned groups of cases. E ese can be found 
in both the civil procedure code itself or in various other codes or acts. E e most usual 
examples of these are some provisions of matrimonial law. Swiss scholarship generally 
accepts that the parties’ claims do not bind judges in this L eld,29 and the Civil Code 
contained certain special provisions pertaining to rules of divorce until the latest 
reforms.30 E e Hungarian legislator followed exactly the same pattern; some articles of 
the civil procedure code assert that in a matrimonial suit, the court can ex o)  cio decide 
about the spouses’ use of the common ~ at.31 Other typical examples are child issues in 
family or in matrimonial law. Swiss law explicitly declares that in family law cases related 
to children, the court is not bound by the parties’ claims.32 On the contrary, Hungarian 
law applies a more casuistic approach. It enlists certain special cases when the court can 
act independently; for instance for the accommodation of the child or children with one 
of the spouses, and the broadening or limiting of parental supervisory rights.33 Lastly, 
it should also be mentioned that Hungarian law also renders it possible to appoint a 
temporary trustee even before the start of the hearings or when hearings are adjourned.34
E e second part of these exceptions comes from the case law of national courts. 
Hungarian courts, for instance, developed further exceptions having no precise legal basis 
in codiL ed civil procedure or in other civil law rules. Perhaps, the most relevant of these 
is the consistent practice of courts that they are not bound by the claims when they make 
a decision about the form of compensation (in integrum restitutio or the compensation 
of losses).35 Other areas of this practice include providing interim measures concerning 
27 Article 3(2) Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure.
28 Article 58(1) Swiss Code of Civil Procedure.
29 K. Spuhler, L. Tenchoi and D. Infanger (eds.), Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, p. 322.
30 Ibid.
31 Article 287. §Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure.
32 Article 296(3) Swiss Code of Civil Procedure.
33 Article 287. §Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure.
34 Article 308/A. §Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure.
35 E e Hungarian Supreme Court declared this in an opinion aiming to provide orientation for the case 
law of the Hungarian lower level courts (Legfelsőbb Bíróság PK. 44.). E is position was reasserted in 
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child support in the case of divorce,36 the elimination of common property, the violation 
of personal rights, or the consequences of trespass.37 E us, through a consistent line of 
case law, courts can gain leeway to raise points of law on their own motion, even if it 
seems to be contrary to the underlying principle.
E e last way to acquire certain opportunities under the rigid rule of general prohibition 
is by an interpretative approach. Both the Italian and Hungarian laws authorize the 
courts to interpret the parties’ claims from a substantive point of view.38 E is means that 
the content of claims must always be determined by their substance, not by their strict 
form and wording. As a special point, Italian law even accepts that the goals, so to say, the 
interest of the parties, could also be taken into account in this substantive interpretation. 
Obviously, the precise boundaries of this kind of interpretation have always been blurred 
in the light of recent developments of case law, so it is impossible to speak of it in general 
terms. In Hungary, however, there is a clear tendency in the application of this provision: 
courts only rely on this provision in the qualiL cation of procedural issues. For example, 
if a counterclaim does not contain in its title the term ‘counterclaim’, which is otherwise 
a constitutive requirement, but the aim is obvious from the content, the court will handle 
it as if it were a valid counterclaim and does not dismiss it due to the lack of a constitutive 
element.39
In sum, these exceptions oj er possibilities for judges to raise points of law on their own 
motion. Subsequently, even in regimes focusing on the strict prohibition, judges are able to 
exercise their rights to autonomous legal decisions, but their playground is certainly not the 
broadest one. It cannot be denied that this is a necessary development, since the absolute 
prohibition would destroy very important values of civil procedure. E eoretically, all of 
these exceptions can be legitimized by public or third party interest considerations,40 and 
it proves that civil procedure is more than a game played by two actors – the plaintij  and 
the defendant. Civil procedure should always regard the broader context of its operation; 
thus, it does not operate in the vacuum of exclusive private interests.
another opinion on the problems of incorrect performance (2/2011. (XII. 12.) PK vélemény). Actually, 
since the new Civil Code came into ej ect on 14  March 2014 and restructured the general rules of 
compensation, the procedural points of the Supreme Court’s opinion PK 44 are still valid while its 
substantive part lost its relevance (1/2014 PJE Határozat (Uniformity decision)).
36 Székesfehérvári megyei Bíróság Pf. 20 903/1980 – BH 1982. évi 3/97.
37 J. Németh and D. Kiss (eds.), A polgári perrendtartás magyarázata 1 (Complex, 2010), p. 73–74.
38 In Italian law, case law created this exception, see for example, Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Lavoro 
Civile, Sentenza 11 gennaio 2011, n. 455. Compare S. Grossi and M.C. Pagni, Commentary on the 
Italian Code of Civil Procedure, p.  158–159. In Hungarian law, the legislator made it explicit in the 
second sentence of Article 3(2) Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure. Furthermore, the case law of the 
Hungarian Supreme Court also accepted that if a court requaliL es the title of a claim, this does not 
amount to the breach of the principle that the court is bound by the parties’ claims. See Legfelsőbb 
Bíróság Pfv. VII 20.618/1998. sz. – BH 2000. évi 20. sz.
39 Compare for example, Legfelsőbb Bíróság Gf. III. 30 773/1988 – BH 1989. évi 6/244. sz. or Legfelsőbb 
Bíróság Pf. IV. 20 670/1991. – BH 1992. évi 2/113. See L. Gáspárdy et al., Polgári perjog. Általános rész, 
p. 75–77.
40 K. Spuhler, L. Tenchoi and D. Infanger (eds.), Schweizerische Zivilprozessordnung, p. 321.
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§4. MODEL TWO: GENERAL AUTHORIZATION UNDER 
STRICT CONTROL
A. THE FRENCH APPROACH
French law regulates the problem of courts’ raising points of law on their own motion 
based on various principles through their reL ned harmonization. E e L rst principle 
appearing in this setting is the parties’ autonomy over both the institution of proceedings 
and the determination of their content. E e very L rst article of the French Code of Civil 
Procedure (Nouveau Code de Procédure Civile)41 points out that only the parties have 
the right to commence a lawsuit,42 while another provision declares that the subject 
matter of a dispute is determined by the parties’ claims.43 Furthermore, this principle is 
strengthened by the next provision, stressing that the judge can only adjudicate upon the 
points submitted by the parties, and must do so in any event.44 E us, parties’ autonomy 
is one of the underlying principles of French civil procedure.
1.   e primary solution: general authorization and the role of ‘principe de la 
contradiction’
E e French Code of Civil Procedure regulates the question whether or not judges can 
raise a point of law on their own motion in a rather sophisticated provision re~ ecting a 
fundamentally dij erent understanding of the judges’ role and activity than the earlier 
discussed model of judicial passivity. Article 16 third sentence declares that ‘[i]l ne peut 
fonder sa décision sur les moyens de droit qu’il a relevés d’o)  ce sans avoir au préalable 
invité les parties à présenter leurs observations’. (A judge must not base his decision on 
points of law which he raised on his own motion, without having L rst invited the parties 
to comment thereon.)45
E is sentence is of key importance, so it is worth discussing in detail. First, in theory, 
the a contrario interpretation of this provision points out that French judges have the 
possibility to raise points of law on their own motion if certain conditions are met. E at 
is, they can base their decisions on these autonomously raised points.46 On the other 
hand, this power is strongly limited by the ‘principe de la contradiction’, a corollary of the 
fundamental requirement of fair trial.47
41 For an English translation see N. Brooke (ed.),  e French Code of Civil Procedure in English (Translated 
by Nicolas Brooke) (Oxford University Press, 2008).
42 Article 1 French Code of Civil Procedure.
43 Article 4 French Code of Civil Procedure.
44 Article 5 French Code of Civil Procedure.
45 For the English translation, see N. Brooke (ed.),  e French Code of Civil Procedure in English, p. 4.
46 S. Guinchard, C. Chainais and F. Ferrand, Procédure civil: droit interne et droit de l’Union européenne 
(31st edition, Dalloz, 2010), p. 573.
47 Ibid.
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E e case law of French courts as well as French scholarly opinion regards this principle 
as a cornerstone of civil procedure.48 It implies that each party has the right to get to know 
and discuss every submission presented to the judge during the trial. E us, parties have 
an absolute right to be informed about any legal or factual element that has the ability to 
in~ uence their position. Furthermore, the judge must not only supervise the functioning of 
this principle, but he must respect it in all cases – the code uses a very strong wording here: 
‘en toutes circonstances’ (in all cases) –, therefore he is strictly bound by it.49 In essence, a 
judge cannot rely on such points – issues, explanations, documents50 – in his decision, which 
have not been discussed by the parties, or to which the parties did not have the opportunity 
to react to ‘in an adversarial manner’.51 Additionally, French law established the so-called 
presumption of regularity in oral processes. It supposes that as long as the contrary is not 
proven, the judge’s acts meet all the requirements arising from this principle.52
E is means that the judge can only raise points of law on his own motion if he L rstly 
communicates this intent to the parties and oj ers them proper opportunities to discuss 
it. If he does so, that is, the parties are informed about the intent of introducing non-
submitted points of law into the debate, the French judge can legitimately raise points of 
law on his own motion.
Additionally, theoretical exceptions from this principle also exist. For instance, if the 
parties fail to indicate the legal bases of their claim, the judge has the right to determine 
them without a mutual discussion. However, it is only of theoretical importance since 
according to the French Code of Civil Procedure, if a submission is sent in without the 
explanation of the legal aspects, it can be declared null and void.53 E e one real exception 
where the judge exercises exclusive powers is when ordering provisory execution of an 
order or when L ning the parties.54 E us, French judges have no real possibility to opt out 
from the all-embracing ‘principe de la contradiction’.
48 Nouveau Code de Procédure Civil (98e edition, Dalloz, 2008), p.  31–32.; S. Guinchard, C. Chainais 
and F. Ferrand, Procédure civil: droit interne et droit de l’Union européenne, p.  570. Its importance 
is also stressed by a landmark decision of the Conseil d’État (No. 01875 01905 01948 á 01951, Lecture 
du 12 octobre 1979) by which the Court annulled a number of articles of the French Code of Civil 
Procedure introduced in 1971 and 1972. E ird line of Article  12 French Code of Civil Procedure 
originally provided the court with the right to raise pure points of law on its own motion independently 
of the legal basis referred by the parties. E e Conseil d’État annulled this provision because, in the eyes 
of the court, this article would have been able to seriously curb the essential guaranties – equality of 
citizens and the character contradictoire of the process – of anyone involved in the trial.
49 First line of Article 16 French Code of Civil Procedure.
50 Second line of Article 16 French Code of Civil Procedure.
51 Second line of Article 16 French Code of Civil Procedure. For this translation, see N. Brooke (ed.),  e 
French Code of Civil Procedure in English, p. 4.
52 Nouveau Code de Procédure Civil, p. 35. French scholars strongly criticize this presumption, since it 
seems to be very di9  cult to prove that a judge did not respect the ‘principe de contradiction’ in an oral 
process. S. Guinchard, C. Chainais and F. Ferrand, Procédure civil: droit interne et droit de l’Union 
européenne, p. 579.
53 Article 56 French Code of Civil Procedure.
54 For a detailed discussion, see S. Guinchard, C. Chainais and F. Ferrand, Procédure civil: droit interne et 
droit de l’Union européenne, p. 572–579.
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We may conclude, therefore, that the French solution simultaneously provides both 
an opportunity for judges to introduce new points of law into the debate as well as a 
guarantee that this cannot be done without a preliminary consultation and discussion. 
E us, judges have the right to do so, but they must always keep in mind the requirement 
of fair trial.
2. A secondary option: judges’ power to legally recharacterize the acts and facts
Another way for judges to raise point of law on their own motion is provided by Article 12 
French Code of Civil Procedure. Here, French law also breaks up the principle of party 
autonomy, however, certainly in a dij erent manner. Article  12 French Code of Civil 
Procedure provides certain room for judges to deviate from the parties’ submissions. 
E e French Code of Civil Procedure declares that judges have the power to provide the 
correct legal characterization of the disputed acts and facts and in doing so they are 
unbound by the parties’ initial suggestions.55
It is important that the French Code of Civil Procedure uses the words ‘to give’ 
(donner) and ‘to reconstruct’ (restituer), that is, it emphasizes the inherent and 
independent power of judges to recharacterize the facts from the angle of the professional 
application of law. If someone can give or reconstruct something, it implies that he is not 
bound by any external in~ uences, even by the parties’ interpretation. E e case law of 
French courts oj ers many examples: for instance, a court changed the qualiL cation of 
a work contract with limited duration to an unlimited one,56 or it requaliL ed a layoj  
due to individual reasons to a layoj  due to economic reasons.57 In these and other 
cases,58 the court qualitatively changed the legal positions submitted by the parties, so it 
unambiguously had the opportunity to introduce new legal elements into the dispute via 
the interpretation of facts and acts.
E is power of French judges, however, also has certain limits. Firstly, if the parties 
agree to an ‘express agreement’ (accord exprès) about the legal characterization of certain 
elements of the case, it is always compulsory for the judges.59 E erefore, the parties’ 
common interpretation of facts cannot be changed by the court, even if it seems to be 
incorrect from the court’s perspective. Secondly, judges can exclusively use this power in 
relation to the facts and acts invoked by one of the parties.60 E at is, they cannot refer to 
55 Article 12 French Code of Civil Procedure.
56 Cour de Cassation, Chambre sociale, du 26 mai 1983, 80–42.179, Bulletin des arrêts Cour de Cassation 
Chambre sociale N. 283.
57 Cour de Cassation, Chambre social, du 5 octobre 1983, 81–40.846, Bulletin des arrêts Cour de Cassation 
Chambre sociale N. 472.
58 For example, Cour de Cassation, Chambre civil 3, du 29 janvier 1970, 68–13.431, Bulletin des arrêts 
Cour de Cassation Chambre civile 3 N. 73 P. 53 (here the court re-qualiL ed a contract of sale to a rental 
contract). For more see Nouveau Code de Procédure Civil, p. 22.
59 E ird line of Article 12 French Code of Civil Procedure.
60 Nouveau Code de Procédure Civil, p. 23.
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facts which were not submitted at all, even though they acquired information through 
other uno9  cial channels.
Interestingly, this provision seems to be essentially similar to some of the interpretive 
exceptions mentioned above when discussing the approach of judicial passivity. E at 
is, this article may even be regarded as the appearance of a component of the earlier 
discussed model advocating judicial passivity in French law. It is certainly true from a 
substantial point of view, since some exceptions in the model of judicial passivity make 
it possible to re-qualify the claims. E is is the case for instance in Italian and Hungarian 
law by the way of judicial interpretation. However, the entire context of Article 12 French 
Code of Civil Procedure, with special regard to the general authorization embedded in 
Article 16 French Code of Civil Procedure – and the lack of the general prohibition – 
should also be taken into account, potentially leading us toward a dij erent conclusion. 
E e role of Article 12 French Code of Civil Procedure is not to create an exception to the 
general, prohibitive role but to provide an opportunity to correct the parties’ claims form 
a legal point. E e secondary ej ect of this would also be the ex o)  cio application of some 
civil law provisions.
In general, even if these provisions of the French Code of Civil Procedure use the 
term ‘giving a correct characterization’, that is to say, the legislator seemingly strived to 
avoid the impression that judges could have the opportunity to raise a point of law on 
their own motion in this context, it still provides some possibility to do so within well-
deL ned limits. Moreover, and it should also be stressed, this power of recharacterization 
always remains a possibility and can never be interpreted as an obligation.61
3.   e inK uence of the French approach: the Belgian case law
E e Belgian code of civil procedure (Code judiciaire/Gerechtelijk Wetboek) does not 
contain any provisions concerning judges’ possibilities to raise points of law on their 
own motion. However, the case law of the Cour de Cassation has gradually developed a 
well-functioning solution. In general terms, in harmony with the standards of modern 
procedural laws, the Belgian civil procedure system is also a deeply party-driven one. E e 
parties determine the content of a lawsuit and also control the procedure in its entirety.62
Although the Belgian solution has some unique features, it mirrors the logic of the 
French approach. Originally, the case law of the Cour de cassation was deeply in~ uenced 
by the conviction that the legal basis of a claim could not be transformed by the judges. 
Consequently, judges were generally bounded by the parties’ submissions. E is position, 
focusing on the principle of party control of the procedure (principe dispositif), was 
generally strongly criticized on the basis of French scholarly opinion.63 However, this 
61 Ibid.
62 D. Mougenot, Principes de droit judiciaire privé (Edition Larcier, 2009), p. 92–94.
63 Ibid., p. 117.
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position had started to dissolve into fragmentary decisions during the 1990s.64 In a 
landmark decision in 2005, the Cour de cassation radically changed its position. In its 
‘arrêt de principe’ of 14 April 2005, it made explicit that judges are obliged to L nd the 
proper legal rules for all of the facts that were speciL cally referred by the parties, so that 
they have the possibility to deviate from the original legal qualiL cations. E us, Belgian 
judges can also autonomously raise points of law on their own motion.65
Obviously, this power also has certain important limits. Firstly, the Cour de cassation 
emphasized that the rights of the defence must be respected in any event.66 Here, 
the term of rights of the defence (droit de défense) is slightly misleading, since it has a 
criminal law connotation. However, the literature immediately guides the readers to the 
‘principe du contradictoire’, emphasizing its central place.67 As a result, the Belgian law 
precisely follows the French pattern, providing a key relevance to this principle. Secondly, 
this possibility is also limited by the rule that the subject of the claim – namely, what 
was asked by the plaintij  in factual terms – cannot be changed.68 Lastly, the parties’ 
explicit agreement about the legal qualiL cation of certain facts also prohibits judges from 
autonomously reinterpreting these facts.69
B. TO AVOID THE SURPRISE IN ADJUDICATION: THE 
‘HINWEISPFLICHT’
German and Austrian law approaches our problem from a slightly dij erent position; 
however, it does not deviate from the core of the model of general authorization. Both 
regimes of civil procedure regard the ‘Dispositionsmaxime’ or ‘Verhandlungsmaxime’ as a 
fundamental starting point.70 E us, parties in principle control the scope and the subject 
matter of a civil trial, as is the case in the other legal systems. At this point, German 
law allows for an important exception which is similar to those solutions that regard 
the principle of judicial passivity as the main rule. In the so-called non-contentious 
proceedings, where public interest appears beside the private parties’ interests – for 
instance where a procedure is initiated by the prosecutor;71 or cases where serious public 
interest concerns can be raised – the court has the opportunity to raise a point of law on 
64 Ibid., p. 96.
65 Cass., 14 April 2005 C.03.0148.F.
66 Cass., 14 April 2005 C.03.0148.F/8.; D. Mougenot, Principes de droit judiciaire privé, p. 96.
67 D. Mougenot, Principes de droit judiciaire privé, p. 97–98.
68 Ibid., p. 118.
69 Ibid., p. 117.
70 Compare W.H. Rechberger (ed.), Kommentar zur ZPO (Springer, 2006), p. 926.
71 For example, the prosecutor is entitled to o9  cially start the so-called ‘procedure of declaration 
of death’ if a person has disappeared for ten years. See §16 Verschollenheitsgesetz 1939; various acts 
provide an opportunity for prosecutors to start disciplinary proceedings against either tax experts 
(§113 Steuerberatungsgesetz 1961) or advocates (§119 Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung 1959).
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its own motion, primarily in order to defend manifest public or third party interests.72 
However, in contentious proceedings the primacy of party-control cannot be seriously 
questioned.
As can be surmised, if a procedural regime regards this principle as its fundamental 
basis, the rigidity of the regime should always be somehow relaxed. E e creation of various 
exceptions proved to be one legislative way to manage this. E ese regimes however chose 
a slightly dij erent way to solve the con~ ict of party-control, material justice expectations 
and public/third party interests as compared to the French approach.
E e logic in German and Austrian law is practically similar to that found in French 
Code of Civil Procedure. On its own, their goal may be regarded as a considerable 
dij erence compared to the French solution. Indeed, the main purpose of these 
provisions is that surprise in adjudication must always be avoided, even though the 
proper legal solution of the case may justify the deviation from the original claims.73 If 
a court adjudicates something that does not meet the claims of the parties in a strongly 
party-controlled regime, this would seriously endanger the parties’ right to fair trial 
and might have detrimental ej ects concerning civil law lawsuits. In order to solve 
this apparent contradiction of party interests and material justice considerations, the 
legislation handles the question from the direction of the courts. E ey essentially set 
forth a comprehensive obligation to inform the parties –exactly similar to the case of the 
principe de la contradiction – and it can also be a basis for ex o)  cio application of law, 
although it is not obvious at L rst sight.
1. Courts’ obligation ‘to give hints and feedback’74
Generally, both systems oblige the judge ‘to discuss with the parties the relevant facts 
and issues in dispute from a factual and legal perspective to the extent reasonable’ 
(HinweispK icht).75 German commentators agree with the prominent importance of 
this duty regarding the entirety of the civil procedure; in a very telling way, they call it 
the ‘Magna Charta’ of civil procedure.76 Due to its relevance, it pertains to all judicial 
acts in a civil lawsuit.77 In general terms, the duty of HinweispK icht has three dij erent 
dimensions. It may represent that the judge should initiate a discussion about the factual 
and legal issues of the case in order to simplify the setting; it may also imply that the 
72 Compare P.L. Murray and R. Stürner, German Civil Justice (Carolina Academic Press, 2005), p. 157.
73 Compare A. Baumbach et al., Zivilprozessordnung mit FamFG, GVG und andere Nebengesetzen (Verlag 
C.H. Beck, 2009), p. 697; W.H. Rechberger (ed.), Kommentar zur ZPO, p. 948. Further, see BGH Urteil 
vom 21.1. 1999 – VII ZR 269/97 (arguing if one of the parties makes an improper reference, the court 
has to call the attention to this; further, it has to reL ne this reference and has to provide the opportunity 
to parties to comment thereon).
74 P.L. Murray and R. Stürner, German Civil Justice, p. 166.
75 §139(1) German Code of Civil Procedure; §182a L rst sentence Austrian Code of Civil Procedure.
76 A. Baumbach et al., Zivilprozessordnung mit FamFG, GVG und andere Nebengesetzen, p. 692.
77 P.L. Murray and R. Stürner, German Civil Justice, p. 169.
2
e
 P
R
O
E
F
Balázs Fekete
668 21 MJ 4 (2014)
judge must call the attention of the parties to apparent contradictions; lastly, it may also 
indicate that he/she must point out those facts that are unclear before declaring their lack 
of clarity.78
2. How to base a decision on an apparently overlooked or insigni4 cant point?
E e next provision of this article provides an opportunity for judges to raise points of 
law on their own motion. E e §139(2) of the German Code of Civil Procedure and §182 
second sentence of the Austrian Code of Civil Procedure, declare that the court can only 
base its decision ‘on a point of fact or law which a party has apparently overlooked or 
considered insigniL cant’79 if it calls the parties attention to this point and oj ers them 
proper opportunity to comment thereon.80 Furthermore, the German legislator also 
requires the judges to apply the earlier rule, if they regard certain points of law or fact 
fundamentally dij erently from the common understanding of the parties.81 It is worthy 
of mention that German law uses this term ‘point’ (Gesichtspunkt) in a very broad sense. 
E e commentary points out that a ‘point’ can be practically everything, and there is 
no clear dividing line between factual or legal points. Whether a point of law or fact 
is apparently overlooked or considered insigniL cant has to be assessed always on the 
basis of the earlier declarations made in the claims or during the hearings.82 E us, if a 
court wants to introduce a new element to the trial, the parties must always be invited 
to discuss it in detail. Essentially, through this reL ned phrasing of these articles, the 
legislator silently oj ers the option of deviating from the parties’ claims, that is, of raising 
points of law autonomously.
Hence, German and Austrian judges are under a comprehensive obligation to 
mutually discuss ‘the relevant facts and issues in dispute’.83 Further, this provision oj ers 
them certain powers to introduce ex o)  cio new legal elements into the dispute. E us, 
judges of the German-speaking legal world can also shape their cases to a certain extent 
autonomously. E e main question here is the scope of this judicial power. Can they raise 
absolutely and qualitatively new points of law on their own motion arguing that the 
given point was considered insigniL cant?
Of course, the case law is always inconsistent, but commentators agree that the very 
subject matter of a case and the ‘goal of the case’ cannot be altered by the hints of the 
court. Additionally, suggesting that the party may enlarge its demand or add another 
claim is also prohibited.84 E e court therefore has considerable room to play with, but 
78 Ibid., p. 169.
79 E is English translation can be found in P.L. Murray and R. Stürner, German Civil Justice, p. 168.
80 §139(2) German Code of Civil Procedure; §182a second sentence Austrian Code of Civil Procedure.
81 §139(2) second sentence German Code of Civil Procedure.
82 A. Baumbach et al., Zivilprozessordnung mit FamFG, GVG und andere Nebengesetzen, p. 698.
83 §139(1) German Code of Civil Procedure.
84 P.L. Murray and R. Stürner, German Civil Justice, p. 172.
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there is a fundamental limit: judges cannot qualitatively change a claim by raising points 
of law on their own motion.
3. Some other common rules
Both provisions – the general obligation of mutual discussion and the possible 
introduction of new elements – have some common rules. E e timing, the form, and the 
consequences of these judicial acts are also worthy of a concise analysis as they are set 
forth in recent German law.
First, timing is important, as it may have a serious impact on the trial strategies 
followed by the parties. As a main rule, the court should always give su9  cient and 
adequate time for the parties to address the issue raised by the court. In simple cases, 
immediate answers can reasonably meet this requirement; however, in cases that are 
more complicated the court should await the written reactions of the parties concerned. 
If the court did not give appropriate time to react to its hints, it can be viewed as a denial 
of the constitutional right to be heard.85
Secondly, how should a judge fulL l this obligation in reality? In general, there are no 
strict rules; the judges can exercise their obligation in various forms. Statements during an 
oral hearing, questions to the parties, or even various orders can be proper instruments. 
What is important is that they must always act in the presence of both parties; they 
cannot communicate solely with one of the parties or their counsels.86 Moreover, ‘hints 
and feedback’ are to be documented in the case record as soon as possible, since it can be 
important evidence in the next possible phase of the proceeding.87
Lastly, the impact of case law from higher courts has to be factored in. 
Commentators agree that the failure of a judge to comply with this rule, that is, to 
give proper advice to the parties or to provide insu9  cient possibility to comment on 
his suggestion may be grounds for both second instance appeal or review appeals.88 
E e breach of this duty is one of the important procedural errors frequently invoked 
in appeal submissions.89
85 Ibid., p. 171.
86 Ibid., p. 174–175.
87 §139(3) German Code of Civil Procedure.
88 Compare BVerwG, Beschluss vom 16.6.2003 – 7 B 106. 02 (explaining that the main goal of this 
obligation is to protect the requirement of a fair trial).
89 See for example, BGH Urteil vom 4.10.2004 – II ZR 356/02 (the appellate court considerably and 
unprecedentedly deviated from the interpretation of a contract given by the court of L rst instance 
without indicating it to the parties that it could be regarded as a breach of §139(2) German Code of Civil 
Procedure). BGH Urteil vom 14.10.2004 – VII ZR 180/03 (the court argued that an appeal cannot be 
refused if the lower court did not make all the necessary ej ort to inform the parties); P.L. Murray and 
R. Stürner, German Civil Justice, p. 175–176.
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§5. COMPARATIVE LESSONS AND SUPRANATIONAL 
EFFORTS
Having regarded the models setting forth certain opportunities to raise points of law 
on their own motion for civil courts, two preliminary conclusions can be formulated. 
Firstly, as there is no common legal solution to this problem in Europe, the national legal 
systems encompass rather divergent approaches. Secondly, however, and this should also 
be stressed, some common points exist in this colourful landscape of various principles 
and dij erent legal logic.
A. COMPARATIVE LESSONS
1.   e coexistence of both an abstract common core and a colourful diversity of 
detailed provisions
Having L nished a comparative analysis one should try to identify the common core 
of the national solutions analysed earlier. If one cannot L nd such a common core, it 
does not mean that the research can be considered as unsuccessful since this may also 
point out important conclusions. For instance, the lack of a common core may indicate 
either the overwhelming importance of cultural factors or the incompatibility of legal 
thinking and logic, providing a framework for the provisions studied.90 E erefore, the 
paper again follows Schlesinger’s methodological insights on the design of comparative 
law research.91 As a conclusion, this paper argues that it is possible to identify a common 
core of the civil procedure provisions studied on the level of legal principles. However, 
national provisions show such an inherent diversity that a similar common core cannot 
be found when comparing the very detailed rules including case law.
On a higher level of abstraction, that is, on the level of principles, it can be argued 
that the common core of these civil procedure solutions consists of two elements. E e 
L rst element is the assumption that civil procedure is party-driven and party-oriented 
in general.  Each legal system analysed accepts this starting point as established. It is 
mainly declared within the very L rst articles of the various civil procedure codes,92 and 
scholarly public opinion further shares this view unambiguously.93 In addition, the 
principle that judges are allowed to adjudicate only within the boundaries of the parties’ 
90 Even if the diversity of national procedural laws is striking or apparent on many points, it is argued 
that in any event a certain convergence can be noted. Compare Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in 
Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 van Schijndel, para. 33–37.
91 Compare R.B. Schlesinger, in K. Nadelmann et al. (eds), XXth Century Comparative and ConK ict Laws. 
Legal Essays in Honor of Hessel E. Yntema.
92 For example, Articles 1 and 4 French Code of Civil Procedure.
93 For example, W.H. Rechberger (ed.), Kommentar zur ZPO.
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claims (meaning that they are generally bound by the parties’ will) is the most natural 
and logical consequence of this.
However, the common core also contains another element. It cannot be overlooked 
that even those legal systems that regulate our problem from a very strict perspective 
provide certain exceptions under the general rule. Other procedural regimes are more 
generous with the judges; they even explicitly authorize them to raise points of law 
autonomously. Overall, it is not the opportunity for judges to raise points of law ex o)  cio 
that is the real question, but its logic and scope. E erefore, national provisions show a 
real diversity – there are many dij erent solutions to provide certain liberties for judges 
in these cases.
Accordingly, the common core of the studied European solutions allowing judges to 
introduce new legal elements on their own motion in a civil trial can be constructed as 
follows. Generally, the civil procedure regimes prohibit judges from raising points of law 
autonomously, but they always provide them with a certain leeway – narrower or broader 
– to raise points in the form of exceptions or a general, but controlled, authorization. 
SpeciL cally, neither the general prohibition, nor the explicit authorization exists in these 
systems; the legislators always try to strike a fair balance between the various competing 
interests.
In sum, this common core is a good match with the factual starting point of this 
research discussed in the introductory part. Both parts of the common core coincide 
with its two components. On the one hand, the principle that civil procedure is of a 
party-driven nature implies that judges are bound by the submissions of the parties. 
E at is, the capacity of judges to act is substantially limited by the will of the parties as 
it is expressed in their claims and submissions. On the other hand, those provisions that 
set forth narrow or broad exceptions under the general rules provide certain autonomy 
for the judges to base their decisions on legal points not referred by the parties. E at is, 
the abstract common core identiL ed seems to justify both the method applied in this 
research in general and the starting factual situation speciL cally.
2. Varying features of national solutions
E ose parts of the national rules where one cannot identify such common points are also 
worthy of a detailed analysis.94 E is diversity can inform us about our legal thinking, 
mostly about the dij erences among national legal cultures.
Primarily, the divergence of the national approaches regarding the exemptions under 
the general party-driven nature of civil procedure should be noticed. In some systems 
there are strict exceptions stemming from case law, a legislative source, or even an 
94 Compare G. Frankenberg, ‘Critical Comparison: Re-thinking Comparative Law’, 26 Harvard 
International Law Journal (1985), p. 411–456; J. Husa, ‘Farewell to Functionalism or Methodological 
Tolerance?’, Rabels Zeitschri9  (2003), p. 419–447.
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interpretive source. Other systems allow the judges to raise points of law on their own 
motion due to a general authorization. However, this permission has two main forms, as 
is evident from French and German law, and they further have strict and precise limits, 
mainly arising from principles setting forth procedural guarantees as requirements of 
fair trial.
Furthermore, courts may have indirect options to raise points of law autonomously as 
it is granted by French law, where judges have a general possibility to requalify the facts 
and the acts in a given case, independently of the initial suggestions of the parties.95 E e 
interpretive exceptions oj ered by the Italian and Hungarian law – namely that courts 
should always interpret the parties’ submissions according to their substance – appear to 
be another dimension of this indirect solution.96
Moreover, there are legal systems where a general authorization exists. E e provisions 
of Austrian, French and German procedural law indicate that in these regimes judges have 
the option to introduce new elements into the discussion. E e most direct manifestations 
are found in the French and Belgian provisions, which allow for the possibility for judges 
to deviate from the parties’ original claims, but if a judge does so, he must always respect 
the requirements of a fair trial and he must provide appropriate opportunities for the 
parties to discuss and comment on his suggestion. Hence, he cannot act unilaterally; the 
introduction of a new legal point always has to be the result of a mutual discussion with 
the parties.
E e German regulation represents another approach as it creates a comprehensive 
duty for judges to discuss the legal and factual points of the case and ‘to give hints and 
feedback’97 to the parties. Further, it also creates the possibility to base a judgment 
or decision on ‘apparently overlooked’ legal or factual points or points ‘considered 
insigniL cant’, that is, to raise points of law based on marginal elements of the case. E us, 
judges of the German-speaking legal world can also raise points of law on their own 
motion by giving ‘hints and feedback’, but some strict limits must also be respected. On 
the one hand, they should discuss it in detail with the parties, as French judges must, and, 
on the other hand, they cannot change the very subject matter of the case by suggesting 
substantial additions to the given claim.
To make the whole picture more complete, another question is discussed in brief 
to illustrate how sophisticated dij erences exist in the national regulations. From the 
perspective of this comparison, the French and the German solutions are structurally 
identical as both provide a general authorization for judges to introduce new legal points 
ex o)  cio and both solutions put a serious emphasis on the requirements of a fair trial 
and procedural guarantees. E erefore, they are classiL ed under the model of general 
authorization. However, important dij erences also exist between them. Firstly, under 
95 Article 12 French Code of Civil Procedure.
96 Compare Article 3(2) Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure.
97 P.L. Murray and R. Stürner, German Civil Justice, p. 166.
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French law the judge can always freely give the legal characterization of the facts provided 
by the parties, so he is not bound by the parties’ initial suggestions. However, in German 
law, the judge should always respect the subject matter and goal of a case, so he does 
not have such a broad discretionary power of legal characterization. Secondly, this re-
characterization is optional in French law, so it is at the judges’ discretion, but, according 
to the German rules, the discussion of the elements of the case including the hints and 
feedback, concerning overlooked or marginal points is an obligation.
In conclusion, it can be summarized that to raise points of law on the courts’ own 
motion, the analysed legal systems oj er two fundamentally dij erent options. E e L rst 
one can be called the fragmentary approach, where judges have no general authorization 
to do so, but through a reL ned network of exceptions, they have certain, broader or 
narrower, options to exercise this power. E e second one is the model of general 
authorization with clear-cut limits. E e interpretation of certain provisions allows 
judges to autonomously raise points of law, but they can only do it within very strict 
limits. E e requirements of fair trial and the subject matter of the case can be regarded 
as the main constraints.
3. Motives behind the scene
As a result of this comparison, we have formulated certain impressions about the 
possible driving forces behind these regulations. What is the main impetus that formed 
the current shape of these solutions? At the outset, the respect of parties’ autonomy in 
civil cases has to be mentioned as being one of the cornerstones of modern law. E is 
assumption arises from the classic modern liberal anthropology, putting focus on the 
autonomy and responsibility of human beings.98 If people are able to recognize, and 
decide autonomously about their interests, their rights to control the content and scope 
of civil procedure can hardly be questioned and restricted. In this setting, the judge must 
act as a neutral actor who controls the whole process and observes its compliance with 
the law. However, active participation in the case is unnecessary, since the parties are 
better informed about their interests and situation than an outsider could ever be.
It is obvious that such a party-oriented system cannot ej ectively work, since other 
interests should also be taken into consideration to have a fair decision. Law always 
strives to obtain manifold goals, and this is signiL cantly true for civil procedure.99 Aside 
from party interests, material justice expectations and the respect of public or third party 
interests also have to be taken into account. E erefore, judges need to have a certain 
room to deviate from the parties’ claims. Sometimes the parties can make bad choices 
concerning their legal argumentation, sometimes such circumstances emerge that may 
justify the judges’ intervention through raising points of law on their own motion. E us, 
98 Compare J.S. Mill, On Liberty (Ticknor and Fields, 1863), especially chapters II and III, p. 104–180.
99 G. Radbruch, Rechtsphilosphie.
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the respect of various other interests, mostly public or third party interests, is also an 
important stimulus for these solutions.
In conclusion, European legislators were always aware of the fact that private 
interests dominating the entire civil procedure should somehow be balanced against 
other, important considerations, such as public or third party interests. As a result, 
they tried to strike this fair balance in each case even though the outcome of their 
ej orts considerably dij ers from the other. Nevertheless, the intention to L nd a proper 
balance of interests in a deeply party-driven procedural structure is certainly a 
common point.
B. TOWARDS A ‘IUS COMMUNE’ SOLUTION?
A commonly stated catchphrase of the last two decades’ public legal thinking within 
Europe has been a reference to either ‘legal harmonization’ or ‘legal uniL cation’. Many 
scholarly projects have been started in order to explore the possibilities of harmonizing 
given L elds of law.100 Obviously, civil procedure has also been studied in this way, and 
some L nal drav s are interesting from our point of view.101
One may recognize that, regarding our problem, the philosophy underlying these 
drav s follows the general European pattern. As for the party-driven nature of the civil 
procedure, both drav s agree. E e ‘Storme Report’ indicates that this principle was among 
those underlying principles that the Working Group accepted without any doubts.102 
E e ALI/UNIDROIT drav  also points out that proceedings should be started by the 
plaintij , likewise it expressly excludes that proceedings could be initiated by the court 
‘acting on its own motion’.103 E e next article stresses that the scope of the proceeding is 
fundamentally determined by the parties.104
Having clariL ed the starting point, both drav s regulate the question of the courts’ 
autonomous power to introduce new elements based on the French model, stressing the 
importance of a fair trial. Neither of them prohibits or allows the introduction of new 
elements to the trial explicitly, but both of them use a broad phrasing. Interestingly, the 
‘Storme Report’ discusses this question in a negative sentence by pointing out that ‘the 
court may not apply, for the purposes of its judgment, a rule or principle of law which 
100 See for example the so-called ‘Trento Project’ (www.common-core.org/) or the ‘Ius Commune 
Casebooks’ project (www.casebooks.eu/welcome/).
101 See M. Storme (ed.), Rapprochement du Droit Judiciaire de l’Union européenne – Approximation of 
Judiciary Law in the European Union (Kluwer, 1994); ‘E e ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational 
Civil Procedure’, 4 Uniform Law Review (2004), p. 758–808.
102 M. Storme (ed.), Rapprochement du Droit Judiciaire de l’Union européenne – Approximation of Judiciary 
Law in the European Union, p. 64.
103 P-10.1., ‘E e ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure’, 4 Uniform Law Review 
(2004), p. 776.
104 P-10.3., ibid.
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has not been invoked by a party unless (…)’,105 while the ALI/UNIDROIT principles 
suggest an a9  rmative regulation, stating that ‘the court may (…) rely upon a legal theory 
(…) that has not been advanced by a party’.106 Here, the wording is perhaps not the 
most concise since the term ‘legal theory’ is normally not used in such a context, but the 
general meaning is understood.
E eoretically, the L rst part of these provisions makes it possible for the judges to raise 
points of law on their own motion. However, they also impose strict limits on this option. 
Both of them refer to the ‘principe de la contradiction’ from the French legal system, since 
they declare that courts must allow the parties to comment on these suggestions of the 
court.107 Based on the earlier comparative analysis, it is easy to reveal the similarities of 
these proposals to that pattern of regulation that was introduced by the French law.
At the very L rst sight, the supranational reception of French law seems to have no 
practical relevance since some autonomy for judges to raise points of law on their own 
motion is guaranteed by the other model, too. Either the model of general authorization, 
on which French law is based, or the model of fragmentary exceptions lead to the same 
result in practical terms. However, due to their dij erent underlying logic with special 
regard to the high priority of the principle of fair trial and its requirements, one may 
conclude that it is certainly a proper choice to design ius commune rules inspired by 
French law. E is setting of the ex o)  cio application of law in civil trials deL nitely provides 
a higher level of procedural guarantees for the parties involved than those that set forth a 
similar autonomy through a complex network of exceptions.
Additionally, these two harmonization proposals may also illustrate that it is simply 
impossible to L nd a uniL ed solution to our problem for all EU civil procedure regimes; 
a harmonization or approximation attempt should always choose one pattern from the 
various options. It seems that this divergence, in this very important segment, cannot 
really be resolved since the divergence is related to the ‘deep structures’ of diverse 
legal culture, referring to the logic of legal thinking and assumptions about the role of 
judges.108
105 M. Storme (ed.), Rapprochement du Droit Judiciaire de l’Union européenne – Approximation of Judiciary 
Law in the European Union, p. 194, Article 3.5.
106 P-22.2 and P-22.2.3., ‘E e ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure’, 4 Uniform 
Law Review (2004), p. 798.
107 M. Storme (ed.), Rapprochement du Droit Judiciaire de l’Union européenne – Approximation of Judiciary 
Law in the European Union, p. 194, Article 3.5: ‘(…) all the parties have had the opportunity to be heard 
thereon’; P-22.2, ‘E e ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Procedure’, 4 Uniform Law 
Review (2004), p. 798, states that ‘[t]he court may, while aj ording the parties opportunity to respond: 
(…)’.
108 P. Legrand, 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1996), p. 64–74.
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